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Audit Office Size, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing 
 
  
SUMMARY: Using a large sample of U.S. audit client firms over the period 2000-2005, 
this paper investigates whether and how the size of a local practice office within an 
audit firm (henceforth, office size) is a significant, engagement-specific factor 
determining audit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit firm size at the national 
level and auditor industry leadership at the city or office level. For our empirical tests, 
audit quality is measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, and the office size is 
measured in two different ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office 
and the other based on a total of audit fees earned by each office. Our results show that 
the office size has significantly positive relations with both audit quality and audit fees 
even after controlling for national-level audit firm size and office-level industry 
expertise. These positive relations support the view that large local offices provide 
higher-quality audits, compared with small local offices and that such quality 
differences are priced in the market for audit services.  
 
Keywords: audit office; office size; audit quality; audit pricing. 
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Audit Office Size, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing 
 
 “The way we think about an accounting firm changes dramatically when we shift the 
unit of analysis away from the firm as a whole, to the analysis of specific city-based 
offices within a firm. In terms of DeAngelo’s (1981b) argument, a Big 4 accounting 
firm is not so big when we shift to the office level of analysis. For example, while 
Enron represented less than 2% of Arthur Andersen’s national revenues from publicly 
listed clients, it was more than 35% of such revenues in the Houston office.” (Francis 
2004, 355) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As alluded in the above quote, the size of a city-based audit engagement office could 
be a more crucial determinant of audit quality (and thus audit fees) than the size of a national-
level audit firm because the city-based office is a semi-autonomous unit within an audit firm 
with its own client base. It is an office-based engagement partner or audit team, not national 
headquarters, who actually administers and implements individual audit engagement 
contracts, including the delivery of audit services and the issuance of an audit opinion. In this 
regard, Wallman (1996) and Francis (2004) argue that the assessment of auditor 
independence needs to focus more on the individual office level rather than the entire firm 
level because most of the audit decisions with respect to a particular client are made within 
each individual office. The anecdotal evidence on the collapse of Enron, which was audited 
by the Houston office of Arthur Andersen, is a good example that demonstrates the 
importance of office-level audit quality.1 However, much of extant audit research has focused 
its attention to two national-level audit firm characteristics as fundamental determinants of 
audit quality, namely: audit firm size (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987; Becker et al. 1998; 
                                                 
1 Choi and Doogar (2005) report that there was no significant difference in the audit quality, measured by the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals and the tendency of auditors to issue going-concern audit opinion, between the 
clients of Arthur Andersen and those of other large auditors. This suggests the possibility that audit failure 
related to Enron is an isolated case restricted to the Houston office of Enron, not the entire Arthur Andersen. 
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Francis and Krishnan 1999; Kim et al. 2003; Choi and Doogar 2005) and auditor industry 
leadership (e.g., DeFond et al. 2000; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2005).  
These studies find, in general, that large audit firms with international brand names 
(i.e., Big 4 auditors) or industry expertise provide higher-quality audit services than small 
audit firms which lack such brand names or industry expertise.2  Implicit in this line of 
research is the assumption that audit quality is homogeneous across offices of various sizes 
located in different cities within the same audit firm. As a result, we have little evidence on 
cross-office differences in audit quality, and in particular, whether and how the size of a local 
engagement office has an impact on audit quality and/or audit pricing. A natural question to 
ask is: Is the office size an additional engagement-specific factor determining audit quality 
and thus audit pricing over and beyond audit firm size and industry leadership? We aim to 
provide direct evidence on this unexplored question.  
Several recent studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that audit quality may 
differ across different engagement offices within an audit firm. For example, in the first U.S. 
study that uses each engagement office as the unit of analysis, Reynolds and Francis (2000, 
375) find that when client size is measured at the office level using office-specific clienteles, 
“Big Five auditors report more conservatively for larger clients.”3 Further, Ferguson et al. 
(2003) and Francis et al. (2005) find that city-specific, office-level industry leadership, when 
combined with the national-level leadership, generates the highest audit fee premiums (and 
thus, by inference, higher audit quality) in the Australian and U.S. audit markets, respectively, 
while national-level industry leadership alone has no effect.  Subsequently, Francis et al. 
(2006) document that client earnings quality proxied by abnormal accruals is higher when 
                                                 
2 For convenience, throughout the paper, Big 4 auditors refer to not only current Big 4, but also previous Big 5, 
6, and 8 auditors where appropriate. For a comprehensive review of audit quality research, see Francis (2004).  
3 However, they find no clear relation between client size and auditor behavior when client size is measured at 
the firm-level with national clienteles. 
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auditors are city-level industry leaders alone, or they are both city-level and national-level 
industry leaders. Put differently, their results indicate that national-level industry leadership 
alone has no significant impact on audit quality. More recently, Choi et al. (2007) show that 
the geographical proximity of the city-based engagement office to clients’ headquarters is 
positively associated with the accrual quality of clients, suggesting that the geographical 
location of the auditor’s office is an important engagement-specific determinant of audit 
quality. The above findings, taken together, suggest that city-based, office-level 
characteristics may play an important role in determining audit quality and thus audit pricing. 
It should be pointed out, however, that none of these studies has paid attention to the question 
of whether the size of a local engagement office is systematically associated with audit 
quality and fees paid to auditors.     
To bridge this gap in our knowledge, we investigate a hitherto under-researched 
question of whether, and how, the size of a local engagement office (hereafter, office size) is 
associated with audit quality and audit pricing. We first hypothesize that office size is 
systematically associated with audit quality even after controlling for audit firm size at the 
national level and auditor industry expertise at the office level. As will be further elaborated 
in the next section, one would observe a positive association if the audits by large offices are 
of higher quality than the audits by small offices. Second, we also examine the association 
between the office size and audit fees. Previous research shows that audit quality is priced in 
the market (Choi et al. 2008; Craswell et al. 2009; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005). 
To the extent that the office size is positively associated with audit quality, one can predict 
that the larger is the office size, the higher is the audit quality, and thus the greater is the audit 
fee. Therefore, a positive association between the office size and audit fees could be viewed 
as evidence corroborating the positive association between the office size and audit quality.  
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In testing our hypotheses, we assert that biased earnings reporting can be used to draw 
inferences about audit quality, and we use the magnitude of abnormal accruals as a proxy for 
audit quality.4 To measure abnormal accruals, we rely on two alternative models developed 
by Ball and Shivarkumar (2006) and Kothari et al. (2005). In addition, we estimate the size of 
a local engagement office using the Audit Analytics database which provides the identity of 
audit engagement offices for all SEC registrant clients. We measure office size in two 
different ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office, and the other based 
on a total of audit fees earned by each office.  
  Briefly, our results reveal that, in the U.S. audit market, both audit quality and audit 
fees are positively associated with office size after controlling for audit firm size at the 
national level (proxied by a Big 4 dummy variable), industry leadership at the local office 
level (proxied by an industry specialist dummy variable), and other relevant factors. These 
results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks we perform.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, our paper is one 
of few studies which document that audit quality is not homogeneous across local offices 
within an audit firm. To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first studies that provide 
direct evidence that the size of an audit engagement office is an important engagement-
specific determinant of audit quality in the U.S.5 The results of our study suggest that future 
research on audit quality differentiation needs to pay more attention to office-level auditor 
behavior as the unit of analysis and to the size of a local engagement office. Second, this 
                                                 
4 It is difficult to assess audit quality ex ante because the only observable outcome of the audit is the audit report 
and the overwhelming majority of reports are standard clean opinions. However, as in Myers et al. (2003), we 
claim that high quality audits constrain the extreme accrual choices that managers would like to make for 
financial reporting while low quality audits do not limit such choices and in some cases may even aid 
management in “pushing the boundaries” of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. This claim is consistent 
with the SEC’s view that higher quality auditing will lead to higher quality earnings (see Levitt’s famous 
“Numbers Game” speech in 1998). 
5 A contemporaneous study of Francis and Yu (2009) also report that office size of Big 4 auditors are associated 
with audit quality measured by auditors’ tendency to issue going-concern opinion, client firms’ magnitude of the 
discretionary accruals, and client firms’ likelihood of meeting earnings benchmarks.  
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paper is the first to consider office size as a critical factor in audit pricing. Given that no 
previous research has examined whether audit fees are influenced by the size of a local office, 
our evidence helps us better understand the nature of auditor-client relationships in the 
context of audit pricing.  
Finally, the findings in this study provide both regulators and practitioners with useful 
insights into what determines audit quality and thus audit fees. Our results suggest that 
regulators would have a better assessment of audit quality if they shift the level of quality 
comparison to small versus large auditors at the office level, and away from Big 4 versus. 
non-Big 4 auditors at the national level. Economic theory on quality premiums claims that 
producing goods and services of a uniform quality for various markets and consumers over 
time is crucial for maintaining quality premiums (e.g., Klein and Leffler 1981; Kreps and 
Wilson 1982; Shapiro 1983). Similarly, our evidence suggests that large, Big 4 auditors 
should take care to maintain a similar level of audit quality across offices of different sizes 
because a systematically poor-quality audit service performed by a local office could 
potentially cause damage to the reputation for the entire audit firm.6 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop 
our research hypotheses. The third section discusses the variable measurements and empirical 
models. The fourth section describes the sample and reports descriptive statistics. The fifth 
section presents empirical results. The final section concludes the paper.   
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Office Size and Audit Quality 
                                                 
6 A good example is the case of Enron audited by the Houston office of Arthur Andersen. Ironically, the 
Houston office was one of the large offices among Arthur Andersen’s local offices. 
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A growing body of audit research emphasizes the importance of analyzing the 
behavior of auditors in city-based, local engagement offices.7 However, none of these studies 
has paid attention to the size of a local office in the context of audit quality. Why does the 
office size matter in audit quality over and beyond two well-known audit firm characteristics, 
i.e., audit firm size or brand name (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4) and industry expertise?  
In DeAngelo’s (1981b) framework, an auditor’s incentive to compromise audit 
quality with respect to a particular client depends on the economic importance of the client 
relative to the auditor’s client portfolio.8 Her analysis indicates that large auditors are likely 
to provide higher-quality audit services to a particular client than small auditors because an 
auditor’s economic dependence on that client is negligible for large auditors, and large 
auditors have more to lose (i.e., bear higher reputation loss) in case of audit failures, 
compared with small auditors.  
DeAngelo’s theory can also be applied to the analysis of audit quality differentiation 
between large versus small offices because a local engagement office can be viewed as a 
semi-autonomous unit in terms of its audit decisions, client base, revenue sources, and other 
factors (Francis 2004; Francis et al. 2006; Wallman 1996). Large local offices are less likely 
to depend on a particular client than small local offices because the former have deeper 
office-level clienteles and thus are less economically dependent on a particular client. In other 
words, large offices are less likely to acquiesce to client pressure for substandard reporting 
than small offices.  
Further, local offices, whether small or large, may not bear the full amount of 
reputation losses associated with an audit failure because a substantial portion of the 
                                                 
7 Please refer to Reynolds and Francis (2000), Craswell et al. (2002), Ferguson et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2005 
and 2006), and Francis (2004) for example. 
8 In DeAngelo (1981a), audit quality is a positive function of auditor independence which is defined as the joint 
probability that an auditor will discover a breach and report the discovered breach.    
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reputation losses are likely borne by the national-level audit firm itself. While the reputation 
losses in the event of audit failures are likely to be greater for large audit firms (DeAngelo 
1981b), the losses are not necessarily greater for large local offices than for small local 
offices, because these costs are more firm-wide in nature rather than office-specific.9 This 
means that local offices may be more concerned with the economic importance of a particular 
client than a potential litigation risk from audit failures, in particular, when the offices are 
small in size. The above arguments lead us to predict that large local offices with relatively 
deep local clienteles are less likely to compromise audit quality with respect to a particular 
client, and thus that they are likely to provide higher-quality audit services, ceteris paribus, 
compared with small local offices with relatively thin local clienteles. In such a case, one 
would observe a positive association between office size and audit quality. We call this 
prediction ‘the economic dependence perspective.’    
On the other hand, one may argue that Big 4 auditors with brand name recognition 
have incentives to maintain a homogeneous level of service quality across offices of different 
sizes within the U.S. and/or across countries. The economic model of quality premiums (e.g., 
Klein and Leffler 1981; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Shapiro 1983) suggests that providing a 
uniform quality over time and across different markets and consumers is vital to maintaining 
the premium associated with product or service quality. Similarly, prior studies in the 
marketing literature find that the reputation for product or service quality in one area transfers 
to other areas (e.g., Jacoby and Mazursky 1984; Herbig et al. 1994). These studies imply that 
it is critically important for large audit firms like Big 4 auditors to provide audit services of 
similar quality across different offices located in various regions or countries, irrespective of 
                                                 
9 This notion is evidenced in the Enron debacle and the subsequent Andersen collapse. 
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their size. 10  Beside the aforementioned incentives for large audit firms to maintain 
homogeneous service quality, there are other internal forces which may help large audit firms 
maintain uniform quality across different local offices: large audit firms tend to place more 
emphases on staff training and/or peer review within the firm, and are more likely to use 
standardized audit procedures and techniques (e.g., computerized audit procedures), 
compared with small audit firms. This may facilitate knowledge sharing and transfer across 
local offices within the same firm, which in turn provides large audit firms with a 
comparative advantage in maintaining uniform service quality across local practicing 
offices.11 In this circumstance, one may argue that what matters more is the size of national-
level audit firms, not the size of a local office, and thus, that the office size is unlikely to be 
associated with audit quality over and beyond audit firm size (i.e., Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 
auditors). We call this prediction ‘the uniform quality perspective.’  
Given these two opposing perspectives on the effect of office size on audit quality, it 
is an empirical question whether and how the office size is associated with audit quality. To 
provide empirical evidence on this issue, we test the following hypothesis in null form:     
H1: Audit quality, measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, is not associated with 
the size of a local engagement office, other things being equal.  
Office Size and Audit Pricing 
Like the suppliers of other professional services such as medical doctors and lawyers, 
auditors take into account both the cost of delivering audit services and the quality of audit 
services when pricing their services. Consistent with this view, the extant audit pricing 
models, developed first by Simunic (1980) and further extended by Choi et al. (2008), predict 
                                                 
10 Large audit firms may be in a better position to maintain homogenous service quality across local practice 
offices using various features of internal operations such as common staff training, the use of common computer 
software and audit techniques, knowledge sharing, and the transfer/migration of skilled audit staff among 
practice offices in different locations.  
11 We thank an anonymous referee who brought the issue to our attention.    
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that audit fees, which are equal to audit costs in a competitive equilibrium, are a function of 
(1) client characteristics such as client size, client complexity, and client-specific risk and (2) 
auditor characteristics such as audit firm size and industry expertise at the national level. In 
addition, recent studies by Ferguson et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2005) document that  
auditors with city-based industry leadership are able to charge higher audit fees to their 
clients.  
Office size may influence audit fees through its effect on the cost of delivering audit 
services and/or through its impact on audit quality. Large local offices may have cost 
advantages in producing audit services of similar quality due to economies of scale, which 
enables them to charge lower prices, compared with small local offices. For example, large 
offices are likely to have a larger pool of capable audit personnel who can share their 
understanding of and knowledge about business operations and internal control systems of 
existing and potential clients so that they spend audit resources more efficiently. Further, 
when an office has a larger clientele, audit-related overhead costs allocated to individual 
clients could be lower. These cost advantages may enable large local offices to charge lower 
fees to their clients than small local offices, leading to a negative association between audit 
fees and office size.  
On the other hand, service quality is priced in the market for professional services 
(Tirole 1990), and thus providers of high-quality services should be able to charge higher fee 
premiums than those of low-quality services, as evidenced by the existence of fee premiums 
associated with Big 4 auditors and industry specialists (Craswell et al. 1995; Carcello et al. 
2002; Francis et al. 2005; Choi et al. 2008). This suggests that if large offices provide higher-
quality audits than small offices, one would observe a positive association between audit fees 
and office size. 
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Given the two opposing views on the association between audit fees and office size, 
we test the following hypothesis in null form:     
H2: Audit fees paid to auditors are not associated with the size of a local engagement 
office, other things being equal.  
 
MESUREMENT OF VARIABLES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Empirical Proxies for Audit Quality 
As in many other studies, we use the magnitude of abnormal accruals as a proxy for 
audit quality. Some previous studies use the likelihood of auditors issuing modified audit 
opinions as an additional proxy for audit quality. In this paper, we choose to use abnormal 
accruals rather than audit opinions for the following reason: while abnormal accruals capture 
the quality of accounting information in a more general sense, modified audit opinions are 
related to only a few extreme situations and thus do not differentiate audit quality for a broad 
cross-section of firms (Myers et al. 2003). Moreover, there exists much less variability in the 
audit opinion, which could cause a lack of statistical power in our empirical tests.  
It is well known that the traditional abnormal or discretionary accrual measure using 
the Jones (1991) model is prone to estimation error (Dechow et al. 1995). To alleviate this 
concern, we obtain two alternative measures: (1) abnormal accruals obtained from the Ball 
and Shivakumar (2006) model which controls for the asymmetric timeliness of accruals in 
recognizing economic gain and loss; and (2) abnormal accruals adjusted for firm performance 
using Kothari et al.’s (2005) procedure. We denote these two measures by DA1 and DA2, 
respectively.  
To illustrate how we obtain DA1, consider the Ball and Shivarhumar model below:  
               
jtjtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjtjt
DCFOACFODCFOACFO
APPEARECREVAACRA
jt
εβββ
βββ
++++
+Δ−Δ+=
−−
−−−−
]*)/[(]/[
]/[]/[(]/1[/C
16514
1312111            (1)   
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where, for firm j and in year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals (income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operation); A, ΔREV, ΔREC, and PPE represent 
total assets, changes in net sales, changes in receivables, and gross property, plant and 
equipment, respectively; CFO represents cash flows from operation; DCFO is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise; and ε is the error term.12 We 
estimate Eq. (1) for each industry (by first two-digit SIC code) and year with a minimum of 
20 observations. Our first measure of abnormal or discretionary accruals, DA1, is the 
difference between actual accruals and the fitted values of the accruals from Eq. (1). 
Our second measure of discretionary accruals, i.e., DA2, is computed as follows. For 
each two-digit SIC-code industry and year with a minimum of 20 observations, we estimate 
the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones-model in Eq. (2). Residuals from Eq. (2) are 
DA before adjusting for firm performance. 
     jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt APPEARECREVAAACCR εααα ++Δ−Δ+= −−−− ]/[]/)[(]/1[/    1312111         (2) 
Kasznik (1999) and Kothari et al. (2005) point out that unadjusted abnormal accruals are 
significantly correlated with firm performance. Following Kothari et al., we match each firm-
year observation with another from the same two-digit SIC code with the closest return on 
assets (ROA) in each year. We then compute performance-adjusted abnormal accruals, 
namely DA2, by taking the difference between DA (before performance-based adjustment) 
and the ROA-matched firm’s DA. 
Empirical Model for Testing the Effect of Office Size on Audit Quality 
                                                 
12 Ball and Shivakumar (2006) show that accounting accruals recognize economic loss in a timelier manner than 
economic gain. To incorporate this asymmetry between economic gain and loss into the accrual model, Eq. (1) 
includes three additional variables, namely CFOjt/Ajt-1, DCFOjt, and (CFOjt/Ajt-1)*DCFOjt, into the modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). 
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To test our first hypothesis H1, we estimate the following regression that links the 
magnitude of absolute abnormal accruals with our variable of interest, i.e., the size of a local 
engagement office, and other control variables: 
          
jtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjt
mmiesIndustryDuLAGACCR
CFOBTMISSUELEVLOSSCHGSALE
LNTANASINDSPECBIGOFSIZEDA
εα
αααααα
αααααα
+++
++++++
+++++=
12
11109876
543210 4||
       (3)     
where, for firm j in year t, all variables are as defined in Table 1.  
The absolute value of abnormal accruals, denoted by |DA|, is our proxy for audit 
quality. As mentioned earlier, we use two alternative measures of DA, namely, DA1 and DA2. 
OFSIZE is our test variable which captures the size of a local engagement office within an 
audit firm. We measure this variable in two different ways: (1) the number of clients of a 
local engagement office in the fiscal year minus one, denoted by OFSIZE1; and (2) the sum 
of the audit fees of all clients of a local engagement office in the fiscal year minus the audit 
fee of client j, denoted by OFSIZE2.13 We deflate both OFSIZE1 and OFSIZE2 using the 
largest values of the respective variables. This deflation leads to the values of both variables 
being measured in a unit-free form. An advantage of using these transformed measures is to 
make it easy to compare the effect of OFSIZE on audit quality with the effects of other 
auditor characteristics, i.e., BIG4 and INDSPEC, because all three variables are now in a unit-
free form and range from 0 to 1. Note here that both BIG4 and INDSPEC are dummy 
variables that equal 1 for Big 4 auditors and city-level industry leaders, respectively, and 0 
otherwise.14 
                                                 
13 To calculate OFSIZE2j, we deduct the audit fee of client j from the total sum of audit fees earned by its 
auditor office to exclude the effect of client j’s own size from the variable. However, when we repeat all the 
tests reported in the study without this deduction, we find that all the empirical results do not change 
qualitatively. Similarly, we deduct one from the number of clients of each office (OFSIZE1) to exclude the 
effect of the client itself. For details of our office size measures, refer to the fourth section and Appendix.  
14 INDSPEC equals 1 if the audit office is the industry leader (measured by audit fees) during the fiscal year in 
the audit market of a particular MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) where the audit office is located, and 0 
otherwise. An industry is defined based on the two-digit SIC code (Francis et al. 2005, 2006). 
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We include in Eq. (3) a set of control variables that are known to affect the magnitude 
of abnormal accruals. We include NAS (the proportion of non-audit service fees relative to 
total fees) in order to control for potential detrimental effects of lucrative non-audit service on 
audit quality (Frankel et al. 2002). We include LNTA (log of total assets) to control for the 
client size effect on accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002). BTM (book-to-market ratio) 
and CHGSALE (sales change) are included to control for firm growth, while LOSS (a dummy 
variable for loss-reporting firms) is included to control for potential differences in audit 
quality between loss and profit firms (Choi et al. 2007). We include ISSUE (a dummy 
variable for equity- or debt-issuance) because firms raising capital tend to manage earnings 
more aggressively (Teoh et al. 1998). LEV (leverage) is included because highly leveraged 
firms may have greater incentives for earnings management (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). We include CFO (cash flow from operation) to control for the potential 
correlation between accruals and cash flows (Kasznik 1999; Kothari et al. 2005). Following 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003), we include LAGACCR (lagged total accruals) to control for the 
reversal of accruals over time. Finally, we include industry dummies to control for industry 
fixed effects.. 
Empirical Model for Testing the Effect of Office Size on Audit Pricing 
 To test our second hypothesis H2 regarding the effect of office size on audit pricing, 
we posit the following audit fee model: 
       
jtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjtjt
mmiesIndustryDuDABTMISSUEROA
LEVLOSSEXORDFOREIGNINVRECNGS
NBSEMPLOYLNTAINDSPECBIGOFSIZEAFEE
μββββ
ββββββ
βββββββ
++++++
++++++
++++++=
|*|
4
16151413
121110987
6543210
 (4) 
where, for client firm j and in year t, all variables are as defined in Table 1. Our test variable, 
OFSIZE, is the same as explained in the preceding section. The dependent variable, AFEE, is 
measured as the natural log of the audit fees (in thousand dollars).  
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For control variables, we include BIG4 and INDSPEC to capture the effects of 
national-level audit firm size and city-level industry expertise, respectively, on audit pricing. 
Based upon prior evidence (Craswell et al. 1995; Francis et al. 2005), we expect positive 
coefficients on both variables. Following Simunic (1980) and Choi et al. (2008), we expect 
positive coefficients on all variables representing client size (LNTA and EMPLOY), the scope 
of business (NBS and NGS) and client complexity (INVREC, FOREIGN, and EXORD). We 
include LOSS, LEV and ROA, to control for client-specific risk. Because Simunic (1980) and 
Simunic and Stein (1996) suggest that auditors charge higher fees for risky clients, we expect 
a positive (negative) sign for the coefficients on LOSS and LEV (ROA). We include ISSUE 
and BTM to capture the effect of a client firm’s growth on audit fees. Reynolds et al. (2004) 
report that the demand for audit services is greater for high-growth firms. We therefore 
expect a positive (negative) coefficient on ISSUE (BTM).   
The magnitude of abnormal accruals may also influence audit pricing. Auditors may 
have to spend more time in detecting and restricting the earnings management of clients with 
abnormally high accruals, which in turn causes auditors to charge higher fees to compensate 
for their increased efforts. To control for this potential endogeneity problem, we first predict 
|DA| using Eq. (3). We then include the predicted value of |DA|, denoted by |DA*|, in Eq. 
(4).15 Finally we include industry dummies in Eq. (4) to control for potential variations in 
audit fees across industries. 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE! ] 
 
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample and Office Size 
                                                 
15 For all the reported results throughout the paper, we use the predicted value of DA1, but the results are almost 
identical when we use that of DA2. 
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Our initial sample consists of all firms included in the Audit Analytics database for the 
six-year period from 2000 to 2005 for which data on audit fees and the location of city-level 
audit engagement offices are available. We exclude all client firm-year observations whose 
auditor office is located outside the 50 U.S. states. In other words, we exclude from our 
sample, client firms whose auditor is located in foreign countries or outlying U.S. territories 
(e.g., Puerto Rico, Virgin Island, Guam).16  We further delete observations if their auditors 
are not located in one of 280 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) defined in the U.S. 2000 
Census because it is problematic to calculate city-level auditor industry expertise for those 
firms.17 These procedures leave us with 55,704 firm-year observations. We calculate the 
aggregate number of clients (for OFSIZE1), aggregate audit fees (for OFSIZE2), and auditor 
industry expertise (INDSPEC) for each local engagement office using these observations 
from Audit Analytics.  
Next, we retrieve all other financial data from Compustat, and then merge them with 
the data extracted from Audit Analytics. This merging procedure leads to a loss of 
observations because of no-matching between the two databases and/or missing data. Further, 
we remove firms that belong to financial or utility industries with SIC codes being 6000-6999 
and 4900-4999, respectively, due to the difficulty in measuring abnormal accruals for these 
firms. After applying the above sampling procedures, we obtain a total of 19,499 client firm-
year observations for the test of H1 and a total of 16,559 observations for the test of H2. The 
final sample of 19,499 observations are audited by auditors from 963 unique audit practice 
offices of 387 audit firms located in 128 MSAs.  
                                                 
16 Firm-years whose auditor office is located in Alaska or Hawaii are included in the sample, but the exclusion 
of those observations from our sample does not affect our results qualitatively. 
17 Refer to Francis et al. (2005) for details of MSA classification system, especially footnote 4. 
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Appendix provides six-year pooled summary statistics on the size of local 
engagement offices in our final sample for fiscal years 2000-2005.18  Since the 963 offices 
can be counted up to six times over our six-year sample period, we report descriptive 
statistics of aggregate audit fees (Panel A) and the number of clients (Panel B) for 3,482 
pooled office-years. The tables show significant variations in office size among Big 5, 
Middle 4 and all other small audit firms, and even within an audit firm. The median-size 
office has approximately $1.328 million of aggregate audit fee revenues and about six SEC 
registrant clients. The PWC New York office is the largest in terms of audit fee revenues, 
while the PWC Boston office is the largest in terms of the number of clients. The former 
records about $626 million audit fee revenues in fiscal year 2004 while the latter 358 clients 
in fiscal year 2004. In contrast, 424 office-years (about 12%) have audit fee revenues of less 
than $0.1 million, and 491 office-years (about 14%) have only one SEC registrant client. We 
also observe substantial variations in office size within an audit firm. For example, among 
367 PWC office-years, the median audit fee revenues (number of clients) is about $8 million 
(11 clients), 27 office-years have audit fee revenues of less than $1 million, and 25 office-
years have only one SEC registrant client.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our earnings management measures, 
|DA1| and |DA2|, and audit fee (AFEE) as well as the variable of interest (OFSIZE) and other 
control variables. With respect to the descriptive statistics, the following are noteworthy. On 
average, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is about 10% (14%) of lagged total assets 
                                                 
18 Since these summary statistics are based on the SEC registrant U.S. clients that are followed by the Audit 
Analytics database, the actual size of offices in terms of their audit fees and clients would be greater than those 
reported in the tables. Among Big 5 auditors, Arthur Andersen has the fewest number of office-years because it 
surrendered its practice licenses in 2002. However, in years 2000 and 2001 alone, Arthur Andersen is ranked 3rd 
in terms of market share. To remove the potential effect of Arthur Andersen, we repeat all our tests after 
excluding all the clients of Arthur Andersen but the results are qualitatively similar. 
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when we use DA1 (DA2).19 For two measures of OFSIZE, we report the values before they 
are transformed to values between 0 and 1 in order to show the actual distribution of the 
variables. In our sample, the maximum number of clients that an audit office has (OFSIZE1) 
is 357 and the mean (median) number of clients is about 45 (22).20 The mean (median) total 
audit fee of an office (OFSIZE2) is about $36 million ($14 million). About 79% of clients are 
audited by one of Big 4 auditors (BIG4), and about 47% of clients hire an auditor with city-
level industry leadership (INDSPEC). The average client size (LNTA) is 12.129 which is 
equivalent to about $185 million. The average audit fee (AFEE) is 5.857 which is equivalent 
to about $350 thousand.  
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE! ] 
Table 3 presents a Pearson correlation matrix among variables included in Eqs. (3) 
and (4). Panel A shows the correlation matrix for all the variables used to test H1 (N = 
19,499) and Panel B shows the correlation matrix for selected variables used to test H2 (N = 
16,559). In Panel A, our abnormal accruals measures, namely |DA1| and |DA2|, are highly 
correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.519 (p < 0.01). The two office size measures, i.e., 
OFSIZE1 and OFSIZE2, are highly correlated with each other ( ρ = 0.731), and they are 
significantly negatively correlated with |DA1| and |DA2|. Both |DA1| and |DA2| are also 
correlated with all the other control variables, suggesting that these control variables are 
associated with accrual quality. Finally, we note that the pair-wise correlation among our 
explanatory variables is not very high in magnitude with the correlation between LNTA and 
BIG4 of 0.517 being the highest. Except for the correlation between LNTA and BIG4, there 
                                                 
19 These statistics are similar to the findings in the prior studies of Becker et al. (1998), Choi et al. (2007), Myers 
et al. (2003), and Reynolds and Francis (2001) which use the absolute value of discretionary accruals in their 
analyses. 
20 The mean and median office size reported in Table 2 are greater than those reported in Appendix because 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on client firm-year observations while Appendix provides those on audit 
office-year observations. 
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exist no other correlations which are higher than 0.4. This suggests that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to be a serious problem in estimating Eq. (3).   
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE! ] 
Panel B of Table 3 presents part of the Pearson correlations among the variables 
included in Eq. (4) to test H2. Because the correlations among some of the variables used in 
Eq. (4) are already reported in the Panel A, we report only correlations among AFEE, 
OFSIZE1, OFSIZE2 and other control variables not covered in Panel A. As shown in Panel B, 
we note that audit fees (AFEE) are highly correlated with office size (both OFSIZE1 and 
OFSIZE2) and other control variables, especially with INDSPEC (0.255), BIG4 (0.445), 
LNTA (0.821), EMPLOY (0.613), NGS (0.411) and FOREIGN (0.524).21  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results of Univariate Tests 
 To assess the effect of office size on audit quality and audit pricing, we first partition 
our total sample into two subsamples: (1) the large office sample with office size greater than 
the sample median; and (2) the small office sample with office size less than the sample 
median. We then compare the mean and median of our audit quality measures, |DA1| and 
|DA2|, and our audit fee measures, AFEE, between the two subsamples. Panel A of Table 4 
reports the results of univariate tests for mean and median differences in |DA1| and |DA2|, 
while Panel B reports the same tests for AFEE. As shown in the rightmost two columns of 
Panel A, both t- and z-statistics indicate that the mean and median values of |DA1| and |DA2| 
are significantly smaller for the large office sample than for the small office sample, 
regardless of whether we use the median value of OFSIZE1 or OFSIZE2 to split the sample. 
                                                 
21 Among control variables, the correlations between LNTA and EMPLOY (0.7014), LOSS and ROA (-0.5607), 
LNTA and BIG4 (0.5270) and FOREIGN and LNTA (0.4734) are relatively high. 
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The differences between the two subsamples are highly significant in all cases. These results 
suggest that audit quality, proxied by unsigned abnormal accruals, is significantly higher for 
the large office sample than for the small office sample, which is consistent with the 
economic dependence perspective underlying our hypothesis, H1.   
 [ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE! ] 
As shown in the two rightmost columns of Panel B, both t- and z-statistics show that 
the mean and median values of AFEE are significantly greater for the large office sample 
than for the small office sample. This result is robust to whether we use OFSIZE1 or 
OFSIZE2 to partition the total sample into the two subsamples. These results imply that audit 
fees are significantly higher for the large office sample than for the small office sample, 
which is consistent with the rejection of our null hypothesis, H2.  
In sum, the results presented in Panels A and B, taken together, strongly indicate that 
large local offices are delivering higher-quality audit services than small local offices, and 
that this quality difference between large and small offices are priced in the audit market.  
Results of Multivariate Tests for H1 on the Effect of Office Size on Audit Quality 
 Table 5 reports the results of regression in Eq. (3) for the test of H1. In section A, 
|DA1| is used as the dependent variable, while |DA2| is used in section B. All reported t-
statistics throughout the paper are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations by 
using the White’s (1980) method and the firm-level clustering procedure, respectively.22   
As shown in column (1a), when |DA1| is regressed on OFSIZE1, the coefficient on 
OFSIZE is significantly negative at the one percent level with its magnitude of -0.0193 and t 
= -4.21. This indicates that audit services provided by large offices are of higher quality than 
                                                 
22 For all the regression analyses we performed in this study, we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) to 
examine if the multicollinearity significantly influences our empirical results. Though not reported for brevity, 
we find no case where the VIF value is greater than 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious problem 
for our regression results.  
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those provided by small offices in the sense that the large offices are more effective in 
deterring opportunistic earnings management than small offices.23 As shown in column (2a), 
when |DA1| is regressed on an alternative measure of office size, i.e., OFSIZE2, the 
coefficient on OFSIZE remains qualitatively similar with its magnitude of -0.0176 and t = -
2.05. Section B of Table 5 reports the regression results using |DA2| as the dependent variable. 
Overall, the comparison of the results between Sections A and B reveals that the effect of 
office size on audit quality is robust to alternative measures of abnormal accruals and office 
size. The coefficient on OFSIZE is significantly negative in both columns (1b) and (2b).  
The significantly negative coefficient on OFSIZE we observe in both sections A and 
B of Table 5 leads us to reject our null hypothesis H1, and is consistent with what we call the 
economic dependence perspective that large local offices are less economically dependent on 
a particular client, and thus are able to provide higher-quality audits, compared with small 
local offices.24  
 [ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE! ] 
The coefficients on the control variables are in line with evidence reported in prior 
research. The coefficient on BIG4 is significantly negative, suggesting that national-level 
office size does matter in determining audit quality. The coefficient on INDSPEC is 
significantly negative as well in Section A, and supports the view that an office-level industry 
specialist is more effective than a non-specialist in deterring opportunistic earnings 
management.25 The coefficient on NAS is either marginally significant in columns (1a), (2a), 
                                                 
23 If we measure city-level auditor industry expertise not by the dummy variable but by city-level auditor 
industry market share, the coefficient on OFSIZE1 is -0.0238 with t = -5.17.  
24 However, it is at odds with the uniform quality perspective that large audit firms such as Big 4 provide audit 
services of the same or similar quality across different-size offices within the same firm. To obtain further 
insights into this issue, we perform a subsample analysis using a subsample of only Big 4 clients in the 
subsequent section. 
25 INDSPEC is an indicator variable representing the office-level auditor industry expertise. When an additional 
indicator variable is added to the regression to control for national-level industry expertise, we find that the 
coefficient on this variable is insignificant and that the coefficients on all other variables remain qualitatively 
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and (1b) or insignificant in column (2b), a finding that is consistent with previous research 
that documents a weak (if any) effect of non-audit services on audit quality (e.g., Ashbaugh et 
al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Frankel et al. 2002). Similar to evidence reported in 
previous research (e.g., Francis et al. 2006; Choi et al. 2007), all other control variables are 
highly significant with the expected signs.  
The results in Table 5 clearly reveal that the office size variable, OFSIZE, is a 
significant determinant of audit quality even after controlling for the national-level audit firm 
size, BIG4, and city-level industry expertise, INDSPEC.26 The estimated coefficient of -
0.0193 means that the absolute magnitude of abnormal accruals decrease by about 1.93% of 
the lagged total assets if the scaled value of OFSIZE1 increases from 0 to 1. Considering that 
the mean value of |DA1| is 0.102 as reported in Table 2, it implies that the office size 
determines nearly 19% of the magnitude of absolute abnormal accruals (0.0193 / 0.102 = 
0.1892).27  In short, our results in Table 5 suggest that the size of the audit engagement office 
is an important determinant of audit quality.28  
To further examine whether the effect of office size on audit quality differs 
systematically between clients with income-increasing abnormal accruals and those with 
                                                                                                                                                        
unaltered. For example, while the coefficient on the national-level industry expertise indicator variable is 0.0012 
(t = 0.61), the coefficient on OFSIZE1 is -0.0190 (t = -4.15), that on INDSPEC is -0.0076 (t = -3.63). The results 
indicate that the effect of office-level industry expertise dominates the effect of national-level industry expertise 
in our sample. This finding is consistent with the results reported in Francis et al. (2006).   
26 Note here that all three auditor characteristics, i.e., OFSIZE, BIG4 and INDSPEC, are measured in a unit-free 
form ranging from 0 to 1. The absolute magnitude of the coefficient of OFSIZE1 in column (1a) is 0.0193, 
which is significantly greater than that of INDSPEC which is 0.0092 (F = 4.29 with p = 0.038) and that of BIG4 
which is 0.0062 (F = 4.50 with p = 0.034). Though not tabulated, we also compute the beta coefficient on each 
of these three variables, and find that the beta-coefficient is -0.0254 for OFSIZE1, -0.0187 for BIG4, and -
0.0343 for INDSPEC. The beta-coefficient of -0.0254 means that a 1 standard deviation increase in OFSIZE1 
leads to a 0.0254 standard deviation decrease in |DA1|.   
27 The estimated coefficient of 0.0193 is equivalent to 36.42% of the median |DA1| value which is 0.053 as 
reported in Table 2. .  
28  Though not reported, we also examined whether adding office size variable significantly improves the 
explanatory power of our model by comparing R2 of the full model with R2 of the reduced model which 
excludes OFSIZE.  We find that the incremental explanatory power is significant.  For example, for the model of 
column (1a), section A of Table 5, R2 is 0.2063 for the reduced model without OFSIZE1 while it is 0.2068 for 
the full model with OFSIZE1. This increase in R2 is significant (Vuong’s (1989) z = 2.47 with p = 0.0135). We 
also observe similar significant increases using the models in other columns of Table 5.  
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income-decreasing abnormal accruals, we split the full sample into two sub-samples with 
positive and negative abnormal accruals (i.e., DA1 > and DA1 < 0), and then estimate Eq. (3) 
separately for each sub-sample. Though not tabulated for brevity, we find that the coefficient 
on OFSIZE is highly significant with a negative sign for the sub-sample with DA1 > 0, 
suggesting that large offices are more effective in constraining income-increasing accruals, 
compared with small offices. For example, when |DA1| is regressed on OFSIZE1 and all 
other control variables in Eq. (3), the coefficient on OFSIZE1 is -0.0251 (t = -4.17) for the 
DA1 > 0 subsample. However, the same coefficient is insignificant for the DA1 < 0 
subsample across all specifications.29 This insignificant result suggests that large offices are 
more effective than small offices in constraining income-increasing accruals, but not income-
decreasing accruals.30  
Results of Multivariate Tests for H2 on the Effect of Office Size on Audit Pricing 
Table 6 reports the regression results for our audit fee model in Eq. (4) using a sample 
of 16,559 firm-years. In column (1), we report the result without our test variable, i.e., 
OFSIZE, so that it can be used as a benchmark for subsequent analyses. In column (2), our 
test variable is measured by OFSIZE1, whereas in column (3) it is measured by OFSIZE2. As 
shown in columns (2) and (3), the coefficient on OFSIZE is highly significant with its 
magnitude of 0.7513 and t = 25.58 when OFSIZE1 is used, and of 2.0654 and t = 28.01 when 
OFSIZE2 is used. These significantly positive coefficients on OFSIZE across all cases 
indicate that large local offices provide higher-quality audit services and thus charge higher 
audit fees to their clients, compared with small local offices.31 This is consistent with the 
                                                 
29 For example, if we use |DA1| and OFSIZE1 for the DA1 < 0 subsample, the coefficient on OFSIZE1 is -
0.0086 (t = -1.36). 
30 This result is in line with the finding of Kim et al. (2003) that Big 4 auditors are more effective than non-Big 
4 auditors in constraining income-increasing earnings management, but they are not more effective than non-Big 
4 auditors in deterring income-decreasing earnings management. 
31 We also find that the increase in the explanatory power from column (1) to (2) or from (1) to (3) of Table 6 is 
statistically significant (Vuong z = 12.65 with p < 0.0001 and Vuong z = 19.05 with p = 0.0001, respectively). 
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finding of previous research that high-quality audit services are priced in the market as 
reflected in Big 4 fee premiums and industry expertise premiums (e.g., Choi et al. 2007, 
Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2000; Ferguson et al. 2002 and 2003; Francis et al. 2005).  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE!] 
Overall, the coefficients on the control variables are highly significant with the 
expected signs, except for a few cases. One notable exception is that the coefficient on BIG4 
is insignificant in column (2) and significant with an unexpected negative sign in column (3), 
while it is significant with an expected positive sign in column (1) where OFSIZE is omitted. 
A possible reason for this observed inconsistency is due to a relatively high correlation 
between BIG4 and OFSIZE (0.281 for OFSIZE1 and 0.286 for OFSIZE2). To check this 
possibility, we split our total sample into two subsamples of Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 
clients, and then re-estimate the regressions without the BIG4 variable for each subsample. 
We find, however, that the new regression results for the Big 4 sample as well as for the non-
Big 4 sample are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 6. Though not tabulated for 
brevity, we find that, for the Big 4 sample (N = 12,963), the coefficient on OFSIZE1 is 0.77 
with t = 25.40, while the coefficient on OFSIZE2 is 2.0709 with t = 27.76. We also find that, 
when we perform regressions for the non-Big 4 sample (N = 3,596), the coefficient on 
OFSIZE1 is 1.5148 with t = 4.03, while the coefficient on OFSIZE2 is 25.7672 with t = 12.76.  
In short, the above subsample results suggest that large local offices charge higher 
audit fees than small local offices, and that this ‘large office’ premium applies irrespective of 
whether local auditors belong to a Big 4 or non-Big 4 audit firm. This evidence corroborates 
our earlier finding that large offices provide higher-quality audits than small offices as 
reported in Table 5.  
As shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6, it is also interesting to observe that of the 
three audit firm characteristics, i.e., OFSIZE, BIG4, and INDSPEC, the audit fee effect of 
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OFSIZE is among the highest as reflected in the magnitude and significance of the coefficient 
on each characteristic.32 For example, in column (2), the coefficients on OFSIZE, BIG4, and 
INDSPEC are 0.7513 (t = 25.58), -0.0116 (t = -0.74), and 0.0453 (t = 3.85), respectively, 
suggesting that the fee premium associated with the office size (captured by the OFSIZE 
coefficient) is greater than the national-level Big 4 premium (captured by the Big 4 
coefficient) and the office-level industry specialist premium (captured by the INDSPEC 
coefficient).33          
Sensitivity Checks 
 In this section, we perform various robustness tests. First, when we remove clients of 
each Big 4 audit firm, one at a time, and re-estimate all the regressions, the results remain 
qualitatively unaltered. For example, when we remove the clients of Arthur Andersen and re-
perform the same test as reported in the column (1) of Table 5 (N = 15,478), the coefficient 
on OFSIZE1 is -0.0243 (t = -3.96). When we perform the same test with the clients of Arthur 
Andersen only (N = 3,949), the coefficient on OFSIZE1 is -0.0202 (t = -2.90). These results 
suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by factors peculiar to a large audit firm.   
 Second, using the subsample observations that experience auditor switching during 
our sample period, we examine the relative office size of incoming and outgoing auditors, 
and compare the absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals. Among this subsample (N = 
2004), we find that 1,146 (858) clients switch to a new auditor of larger (smaller) office when 
office size is measured by OFSIZE1. This suggests that client firms in our sample tend to 
switch their auditors from small-office auditors to large-office auditors during our sample 
                                                 
32 Although it is not separately reported, the coefficient on OFSIZE is significantly greater than that on BIG4 
and that on INDSPEC. When we compute the beta coefficients for three auditor-related variables, OFSIZE, 
BIG4, and INDSPEC, the beta coefficient on OFSIZE is the largest, followed by that on INDSPEC and then that 
on BIG4. 
33 Though not tabulated, we also estimated Eq. (4) after adding the national-level industry expertise as an 
additional control variable in the regression. We find that the coefficient on this new variable is insignificant 
across all cases, while the coefficients on the other auditor-related variables remain qualitatively unaltered. 
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period. Taking into account the finding of a strong effect of office size on audit quality, the 
above result is in line with the view that client firms with auditor changes tend to switch to a 
larger-office auditor who possesses a higher quality audit service and a better reputation. In 
addition, we find that absolute discretionary accruals of client firms switching to a larger-
office auditor are lower, compared to those of client firms switching to a smaller-office 
auditor. For example, the mean (median) discretionary accruals (|DA1|) of the former is 
0.1135 (0.0594), whereas that of the latter is 0.1239 (0.0606) when OFSIZE1 is used to 
measure audit office size. The smaller (larger) magnitude of discretionary accruals for client 
firms switching to large-office (small-office) auditors also supports the argument that the 
large-office auditors provide a higher-quality audit service than small-office auditors.  
Third, Hribar and Nichols (2007) suggest that using absolute discretionary accruals 
as the dependent variable potentially biases the test in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of 
no earnings management and that adding volatilities of operating cash flows (STD_CFO) and 
cash-based revenues (STD_REV) as additional controls in the regression model substantially 
improves test specifications. Following their suggestion, we first obtain STD_CFO (standard 
deviations of operating cash flows deflated by lagged total assets for the years from t-4 to t) 
and STD_REV (standard deviations of cash-based revenues (revenues + changes in account 
receivables) deflated by lagged total assets for the years from t-4 to t). We then add these two 
variables into Eq. (3) as additional controls. Although the sample size decreases to 14,443 
due to additional data requirements, the results are qualitatively the same as before. For 
example, if we perform an analysis which is comparable to column (1a) of Table 5, the 
coefficient on OFSIZE1 is still negative and significant (coefficient = -0.0112, t = -2.44). The 
coefficients on STD_CFO and STD_REV are both positive and significant at the 1% level, 
consistent with Hribar and Nichols (2007). 
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Fourth, we test if the differential wage level of auditors across MSAs influences the 
results of our audit fee regressions. We perform this test because large-size offices tend to be 
located in large MSAs such as New York, Boston, and San Francisco where the overall wage 
level is higher. To investigate this issue, we employ the following three approaches. First, we 
divide our sample into two subsamples: (1) the subsample of firms audited by offices in the 
top 10  MSAs where average office size is the largest during the sample period (N = 8,284); 
and (2) the subsample of all other firms (N = 8, 211). We then perform the tests by estimating 
our audit fee regressions separately for each subsample.34 Second, we obtain the statistics of 
mean hourly wage of auditors and accountants in each MSA from 2005 Metropolitan Area 
Occupational Employment Statistics published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and 
then divide our sample into two subsamples: (1) the subsample of firms audited by the audit 
offices located in the MSAs where the mean wage per hour is greater than the overall sample 
median (N = 8,587); and (2) the subsample of all other firms (N = 7, 908). We find that the 
results of our audit fee regressions for each subsample are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 6 in that the office size has a significantly positive association with audit 
fee. Third, when we add the mean wage per hour in each MSA as an additional control 
variable into our audit fee regression without dividing the sample, we find that the results 
remain unaltered. For example, if we perform an analysis which is comparable to column (2) 
of Table 6, the coefficient on OFSIZE1 is 0.6441 (t = 21.65) while the coefficient on the 
mean wage per hour is positive and significant at the 1% level. All these findings indicate 
that our main results reported in Table 6 are unlikely to be driven by differences in the wage 
level across MSAs.  
 
                                                 
34 The top 10 MSAs are Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, Detroit, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Houston, New York, 
Washington, and St. Louis (listed by the order from the largest). 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While previous auditing research has examined whether and how audit fees and audit 
quality are influenced by audit firm size at the national level and auditor industry leadership 
at both the national level and the city level, this line of research has paid little attention to the 
effect of the size of a local engagement office within an audit firm (i.e., office size) in the 
context of audit quality and audit pricing. Unlike previous research, the focus of this paper is 
on whether the office size is an additional, engagement-specific factor determining audit 
quality and audit pricing over and beyond national-level audit firm size and office-level 
industry leadership. Our results can be summarized as follows:  
First, we find that the office size is positively associated with audit quality proxied by 
unsigned abnormal accruals. Our finding is consistent with what we call the economic 
dependence perspective: large (small) local offices with deep office-level clienteles are less 
(more) likely to depend on a particular client, and thus are better (less) able to resist client 
pressure on substandard or biased reporting. Second, we find that large local offices are able 
to charge higher audit fees to their clients than small ones, which is consistent with the view 
that large offices provide higher-quality audits than small offices, and this quality differential 
is priced as a fee premium in the market for audit services. However, the above finding is at 
odds with the view that large offices have a cost advantage in producing audit services of 
similar quality, and thus are able to charge lower billing rates, compared with small offices. 
Taken together, our results highlight that office size is one of the most important 
engagement-specific determinants of audit quality and audit pricing. Lastly, while we use two 
alternative, advanced accrual models to alleviate a concern over the limitations inherent in the 
Jones (1991) model estimates of abnormal accruals, our measures of audit quality, namely 
unsigned abnormal accruals, may suffer from non-trivial measurement errors. We therefore 
cannot completely rule out the possibility that the estimated coefficients on our test variables 
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are biased. However, given that a contemporaneous study of Francis and Yu (2009) 
document the same positive association between audit quality and audit office size using two 
additional proxies for audit quality, i.e., auditors’ tendency to issue going-concern opinion 
and client firms’ likelihood to meet earnings benchmarks, we believe that our results are 
unlikely driven by possible measurement errors. 
Overall, our results suggest that both regulators and audit firms should pay more 
attention to the behavior of small offices because they are more likely to be economically 
dependent on a particular client and, thus, to compromise audit quality. In particular, Big 4 
audit firms may need to implement strategies for providing a more homogenous level of audit 
services across offices of different sizes because a poor-quality audit by a small office could 
significantly damage the reputation of the entire firm. In today’s global business 
environment, the issue of maintaining ‘uniform quality’ should be an even more important 
concern to reputable auditors because their business becomes increasingly internationalized 
in terms of locations and client profiles. For example, it may be more difficult for Big 4 audit 
firms to maintain uniform quality of service at the office level across different jurisdictions 
around the world. Further, local offices in different jurisdictions (e.g., European Union and 
China) have their own client bases, and are likely to be more autonomous in making audit-
related decisions than those within the U.S. It is therefore possible that the size of a local 
practicing office plays a more significant role in determining the quality of audit services in 
other non-U.S. jurisdictions than in the U.S. Given the scarcity of international evidence 
regarding the effect of audit office size on audit quality and audit pricing, we recommend 
further research on the issue using international samples from different jurisdictions.   
[INSERT APPENDIX HERE!] 
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APPENDIX 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON OFFICE SIZE 
 
This Appendix reports pooled summary statistics on the size of local engagement offices in our 
sample for the six-year sample period, 2000-2005, based on the data in Audit Analytics. Individual 
offices can be counted up to six times in the table (i.e., once per fiscal year). Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics on total audit fees (in thousands) of each offices and Panel B presents descriptive 
statistics on the number of audit clients of each office.  
 
Panel A: Audit Fees of Audit Engagement Offices for 2000-2005 (in thousands) 
Auditor N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
PWC LLP 367 28,100 62,744 97.5 2,829 8,024 25,046 626,173 
Ernst & Young LLP 433 17,533 29,786 46.6 2,775 7,276 19,082 270,456 
Deloitte & Touche LLP 378 18,568 38,489 55.0 1,616 6,138 19,818 442,698 
KPMG LLP 452 14,100 29,716 43.7 1,376 4,053 12,168 293,046 
Arthur Andersen LLP 121 7,260 12,913 65.8 1,394 2,890 6,156 96,654 
Big 5 1,751 18,375 40,420 43.7 2,040 5,755 17,765 626,173 
Grant Thornton LLP 197 2,259 3,321 51.8 448 1,155 2,460 24,681 
BDO Seidman LLP 147 2,904 4,566 29.0 432 1,373 2,993 33,350 
Crowe Chizek & Co. LLC 24 879 534 44.2 541 920 1,226 2,038 
McGladrey & Pullen LLP 89 504 591 25.0 144 294 604 3,791 
Middle 4 457 2,052 3,506 25.0 332 895 2,168 33,350 
Others 1,274 488 804 3.0 87 202 542 10,795 
All 3,482 9,688 29,967 3.0 262 1,328 6,245 626,173 
 
Panel B: Number of Clients of Audit Engagement Offices for 2000-2005 
Auditor N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
PWC LLP 367 26.0 48.6 1 6 11 22 358 
Ernst & Young LLP 433 23.4 39.6 1 6 11 22 312 
Deloitte & Touche LLP 378 19.6 37.2 1 4 9 20 318 
KPMG LLP 452 15.6 22.9 1 4 7 19 188 
Arthur Andersen LLP 121 14.9 17.3 1 3 9 15 86 
Big 5 1,751 20.6 36.7 1 4 10 21 358 
Grant Thornton LLP 197 8.6 7.4 1 4 6 11 35 
BDO Seidman LLP 147 8.2 7.7 1 3 6 11 51 
Crowe Chizek & Co. LLC 24 9.3 5.6 1 5 9 12 20 
McGladrey & Pullen LLP 89 2.8 2.4 1 1 2 3 11 
Middle 4 457 7.4 7.1 1 2 5 10 51 
Others 1,274 6.1 8.1 1 1 3 7 68 
All 3,482 13.6 27.6 1 2 6 14 358 
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Table 1:  Variable Definition and Measurement 
 
|DA| = absolute value of abnormal accruals. In the current study, there are two proxies: DA1 and DA2.  DA1 is 
the abnormal accruals measured by Ball and Shivakumar’s (2006) method; DA2 is the abnormal 
accruals measured by modified Jones model and adjusted for firm-performance (Kothari et al. 2005). 
 
|DA*| in Equation (4) is the predicted value of the model in Equation (3); 
 
AFEE = natural log of audit fees paid to auditors; 
 
OFSIZE = the size of a city-based, engagement office within an audit firm. Two proxies are used in the current 
study: OFSIZE1 and OFSIZE2. OFSIZE1 is the number of clients of the office minus one; OFSIZE2 is 
the sum of the audit fees of all clients of the office minus the audit fee of the specific client. Both 
variables are deflated by the largest value of the respective variable and thus are converted into the 
value between 0 and 1; 
 
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of Big 4 firms, 0 otherwise; 
 
INDSPEC = indicator variable for the office-level auditor industry expertise;  It equals to 1 if the audit office is the 
industry leader for the audit year in the audit market of the MSA where the audit office is located, and 0 
otherwise;  We calculate each audit office’s industry market share of audit fees for a MSA as a 
proportion of audit fees earned by each office in the total audit fees earned by all audit offices in the 
MSA that serve the same industry; Each industry is defined based on the two-digit SIC code; 
 
BTM = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
 
CFO = operating cash flows, taken from the cash flow statement, deflated by lagged total assets; 
 
CHGSALE  = changes in sales deflated by lagged total assets; 
 
EMPLOY = square root of the number of employees; 
 
EXORD = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 otherwise; 
 
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise; 
 
INVREC   = inventory and receivables divided by total assets;  
 
ISSUE = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total assets, 0 
otherwise; 
 
LAGACCR  = one-year lagged total accruals; Accruals are defined as income before extraordinary items minus 
operating cash flows from the statement of cash flow deflated by lagged total assets; 
 
LEV = leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; 
 
LNTA = natural log of total assets in thousand dollars; 
 
LOSS   = 1 if the firm reports a loss for the year, 0 otherwise; 
 
NAS = the relative importance of non-audit service, measured as the ratio of the natural log of non-audit fees 
over natural log of total fees; 
 
NBS = natural log of one plus number of business segments; 
 
NGS = natural log of one plus number of geographic segments; 
 
ROA   = return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets). 
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Table 2:   Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% Median 75% 99% 
│DA 1│ 19499 0.102 0.135 0 0.021 0.053 0.126 0.681 
│DA 2│ 19499 0.142 0.164 0.001 0.035 0.084 0.181 0.798 
OFSIZE1* 19499 45.026 63.391 0 9 22 53 317 
OFSIZE2* 19499 36049 63207 0 2695 14042 45037 325309 
INDSPEC 19499 0.471 0.499 0 0 0 1 1 
BIG4 19499 0.790 0.407 0 1 1 1 1 
NAS 19499 0.592 0.355 0 0.368 0.721 0.868 0.991 
LNTA 19499 12.129 2.175 7.429 10.617 12.118 13.582 17.231 
CHGSALE 19499 0.097 0.509 -0.928 -0.032 0.057 0.194 1.535 
LOSS 19499 0.430 0.495 0 0 0 1 1 
LEV 19499 0.532 0.463 0.045 0.270 0.466 0.663 2.388 
ISSUE 19499 0.437 0.496 0 0 0 1 1 
BTM 19499 0.638 0.701 0 0.226 0.442 0.785 4 
CFO 19499 0.016 0.270 -1.041 -0.026 0.068 0.138 0.458 
LAGACCR 19499 -0.118 0.563 -1.262 -0.137 -0.068 -0.020 0.372 
AFEE 16559 5.857 1.333 3.250 4.865 5.730 6.746 9.287 
EMPLOY 16559 53.960 70.628 2 12.845 29.172 65.521 352.846 
NBS 16559 0.996 0.465 0 0.693 0.693 1.386 2.079 
NGS 16559 0.949 0.623 0 0.693 1.099 1.386 2.303 
INVREC 16559 0.273 0.198 0 0.110 0.241 0.394 0.810 
FOREIGN 16559 0.431 0.495 0 0 0 1 1 
EXORD 16559 0.204 0.403 0 0 0 0 1 
ROA 16559 -0.078 0.334 -1.386 -0.101 0.023 0.072 0.299 
 
* OFSIZE1 and OFSIZE2 are converted into the value between 0 and 1 by dividing each observation by the 
maximum value of the variable (OFSIZE1 = 357; OFSIZE2 = 625,965). However, we report the values before 
the conversion for the illustrative purpose in this table. Note that these maximum OFSIZE1 and OFSIZE2 are 
slightly smaller than those in Appendix because we exclude the effect of its own observation to measure 
OFSIZE1 and OFSIZE2. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A: Pearson Correlations among Variables Included in the Audit Quality Model  
 
. │DA 1│ │DA 2│ OFSIZE1 OFSIZE2 IND-
SPEC 
BIG4 NAS LNTA CHG-
SALE 
LOSS LEV ISSUE 
│DA 2│ 0.519 
(<0.001) 
 
1.000           
OFSIZE1 -0.062 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.055 
(<0.001) 
1.000          
OFSIZE2 -0.085 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.087 
(<0.001) 
0.731 
(<0.001) 
1.000         
INDSPEC -0.156 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.121 
(<0.001) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
0.058 
(<0.001) 
1.000        
BIG4 -0.196 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.183 
(<0.001) 
0.279 
(<0.001) 
0.276 
(<0.001) 
0.266 
(<0.001) 
1.000       
NAS -0.098 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.090 
(<0.001) 
0.061 
(<0.001) 
0.074 
(<0.001) 
0.108 
(<0.001) 
0.199 
(<0.001) 
1.000      
LNTA -0.344 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.319 
(<0.001) 
0.158 
(<0.001) 
0.245 
(<0.001) 
0.317 
(<0.001) 
0.517 
(<0.001) 
0.307 
(<0.001) 
1.000     
CHGSALE 0.041 
(<0.001) 
 
0.021 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.304) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
0.027 
(<0.001) 
0.003 
(0.662) 
0.033 
(<0.001) 
0.065 
(<0.001) 
1.000    
LOSS 0.259 
(<0.001) 
 
0.211 
(<0.001) 
-0.016 
(0.029) 
-0.076 
(<0.001) 
-0.139 
(<0.001) 
-0.138 
(<0.001) 
-0.148 
(<0.001) 
-0.353 
(<0.001) 
-0.173 
(<0.001) 
1.000   
LEV 0.146 
(<0.001) 
 
0.104 
(<0.001) 
-0.068 
(<0.001) 
-0.029 
(<0.001) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.144 
(<0.001) 
-0.068 
(<0.001) 
-0.077 
(<0.001) 
-0.082 
(<0.001) 
0.143 
(<0.001) 
1.000  
ISSUE 0.091 
(<0.001) 
 
0.088 
(<0.001) 
-0.024 
(<0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.303) 
0.021 
(0.003) 
-0.015 
(0.042) 
0.005 
(0.517) 
-0.001 
(0.935) 
0.097 
(<0.001) 
0.101 
(<0.001) 
0.136 
(<0.001) 
1.000 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 
 │DA 1│ │DA 2│ OFSIZE1 OFSIZE2 IND-
SPEC 
BIG4 NAS LNTA CHG-
SALE 
LOSS LEV ISSUE BTM CFO 
BTM -0.078 
(<0.001) 
-0.074 
(<0.001) 
-0.081 
(<0.001) 
-0.087 
(<0.001)
0.011 
(<0.124)
-0.030 
(<0.001)
-0.073 
(<0.001)
-0.073 
(<0.001)
-0.127 
(<0.001) 
0.094 
(<0.001)
-0.165 
(<0.001)
-0.134 
(<0.001)
1.000  
CFO -0.298 
(<0.001) 
-0.277 
(<0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.579) 
0.052 
(<0.001)
0.111 
(<0.001)
0.139 
(<0.001)
0.113 
(<0.001)
0.362 
(<0.001)
0.108 
(<0.001) 
-0.489 
(<0.001)
-0.112 
(<0.001)
-0.203 
(<0.001)
0.046 
(<0.001)
1.000 
LAGACCR -0.134 
(<0.001) 
-0.077 
(<0.001) 
0.004 
(0.606) 
0.025 
(<0.001)
0.027 
(<0.001)
0.022 
(0.003)
0.035 
(<0.001)
0.066 
(<0.001)
-0.006 
(0.404) 
-0.118 
(<0.001)
-0.063 
(<0.001)
-0.043 
(<0.001)
0.023 
(0.001)
0.115 
(<0.001)
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations among Selected Variables Included in the Audit Fee Model 
 
 OFSIZE1 OFSIZE2 INDSPEC BIG4 LNTA EMPLOY NBS NGS 
AFEE 0.237 
(<0.001) 
0.360
(<0.001) 
0.255
(<0.001) 
0.445
(<0.001) 
0.821 
(<0.001) 
0.613
(<0.001) 
0.233
(<0.001) 
0.411
(<0.001) 
OFSIZE1 1.000 0.731
(<0.001) 
0.017
(0.031) 
0.281
(<0.001) 
0.156 
(<0.001) 
0.055
(<0.001) 
-0.001
(0.890) 
0.114
(<0.001) 
OFSIZE2  1.000 0.055
(<0.001) 
0.286
(<0.001) 
0.246 
(<0.001) 
0.139
(<0.001) 
0.034
(<0.001) 
0.132
(<0.001) 
         
 INVREC FOREIGN EXORD LOSS LEV ROA ISSUE BTM 
AFEE -0.066 
(<0.001) 
0.524
(<0.001) 
0.197
(<0.001) 
-0.237
(<0.001) 
0.034 
(<0.001) 
0.254
(<0.001) 
0.008
(0.333) 
-0.147
(<0.001) 
OFSIZE1 -0.111 
(<0.001) 
0.137
(<0.001) 
-0.009
(0.224) 
-0.010
(0.184) 
-0.063 
(<0.001) 
0.020
(0.010) 
-0.024
(0.002) 
-0.076
(<0.001) 
OFSIZE2 -0.089 
(<0.001) 
0.173
(<0.001) 
0.013
(0.087) 
-0.073
(<0.001) 
-0.024 
(0.002) 
0.073
(<0.001) 
-0.006
(0.431) 
-0.085
(<0.001) 
 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses.  
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Table 4: Results of Univariate Tests 
 
 
 
Variable 
(1)  
OFSIZE1 ≥ median 
(2)  
OFSIZE1 < median
(3)  
OFSIZE2 ≥ median
(4)  
OFSIZE2 < median
 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
 
Difference 
(4) – (3) 
Mean Median Mean
 
Median Mean Median Mean 
 
Median
 
Panel A: Tests for Differences in Unsigned Abnormal Accruals between Large and Small Offices 
│DA 1│ 0.0968 0.0520 0.1077 
 
0.0551 0.0881 0.0483 0.1178 
 
0.0607 
t = 5.69*** 
z = 3.64*** 
t = 15.47*** 
z = 12.90*** 
│DA 2│ 0.1358 0.0807 0.1479 
 
0.0869 0.1259 0.0757 0.1594 
 
0.0942 
t = 5.15*** 
z = 4.98*** 
t = 14.32*** 
z = 13.53*** 
 
Panel B: Tests for Differences in Audit Fees between Large and Small Offices
AFEE 6.1816 6.0691 5.5353 
 
5.3613 6.3840 6.2955 5.3297 
 
5.1569 
t = -32.15*** 
z = -31.75*** 
t = -55.41*** 
z = -52.20*** 
*** denotes p-value < 1% with two-tailed tests.  
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Table 5: Results of Regressions of Audit Quality on Office Size 
 
  Section A 
Using |DA 1| as the dependent 
variable 
Section B 
Using |DA 2| as the dependent 
variable 
 Exp. 
 Sign 
(1a) 
OFSIZE1 
 
(2a) 
OFSIZE2 
 
(1b) 
OFSIZE1 
 
(2b) 
OFSIZE2 
 
OFSIZE  -0.0193 
(-4.21***) 
 
-0.0176 
(-2.05**) 
-0.0176 
(-3.05***) 
-0.0340 
(-3.38***) 
BIG4 - -0.0062 
(-1.81*) 
 
-0.0075 
(-2.20**) 
 
-0.0116 
(-3.04***) 
-0.0118 
(-3.11***) 
INDSPEC - -0.0092 
(-4.46***) 
-0.0090 
(-4.35***) 
 
-0.0013 
(-0.53) 
-0.0013 
(-0.50) 
NAS + 0.0061 
(2.03**) 
0.0061 
(2.02**) 
 
0.0058 
(1.65*) 
0.0057 
(1.62) 
LNTA - -0.0143 
(-20.17***) 
-0.0142 
(-20.03***) 
 
-0.0166 
(-20.00***) 
-0.0165 
(-19.73***) 
CHGSALE + 0.0237 
(5.60***) 
0.0236 
(5.59***) 
 
0.0185 
(4.32***) 
0.0185 
(4.32***) 
LOSS + 0.0210 
(7.63***) 
0.0208 
(7.58***) 
 
0.0124 
(4.06***) 
0.0122 
(4.00***) 
LEV + 0.0285 
(7.12***) 
0.0288 
(7.19***) 
 
0.0218 
(5.77***) 
0.0221 
(5.84***) 
ISSUE + 0.0056 
(2.89***) 
 
0.0058 
(2.98***) 
 
0.0098 
(4.07***) 
0.0099 
(4.11***) 
BTM - -0.0091 
(-5.98***) 
 
-0.0089 
(-5.87***) 
 
-0.0116 
(-6.24***) 
-0.0116 
(-6.24***) 
CFO - -0.0684 
(-8.40***) 
 
-0.0681 
(-8.38***) 
 
-0.0892 
(-9.64***) 
-0.0891 
(-9.63***) 
LAGACCR - -0.0181 
(-6.18***) 
 
-0.0181 
(-6.16***) 
 
-0.0075 
(-2.23**) 
-0.0074 
(-2.21**) 
Intercept ? 0.2790 
(31.76***) 
 
0.2777 
(31.58***) 
 
0.3599 
(35.06***) 
0.3578 
(34.81***) 
Industry  
Dummies 
 Included Included Included Included 
N  19,499 
 
19,499 
 
19,499 
 
19,499 
R2  0.2068 
 
0.2064 
 
0.1635 
 
0.1635 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering procedure to correct for serial correlation and 
White’s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
****, **, * denote p-value  < 1%, < 5%, and < 10%, respectively with two-tailed tests.  
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Table 6: Results of Regressions of Audit Fees on Office Size 
 
  Dependent variable = AFEE 
  (1) (2) 
OFSIZE1 
 
(3) 
OFSIZE2 
OFSIZE + - 0.7513 
(25.58***) 
 
2.0654 
(28.01***) 
BIG4 + 0.0623 
(4.02***) 
 
-0.0116 
(-0.74) 
 
-0.0352 
(-2.26**) 
INDSPEC + 0.0226 
(1.92*) 
 
0.0453 
(3.85***) 
 
0.0509 
(4.46***) 
 
LNTA + 0.4422 
(69.67***) 
 
0.4541 
(68.71***) 
 
0.4472 
(69.50***) 
 
EMPLOY + 0.0011 
(8.38***) 
 
0.0012 
(9.12***) 
 
0.0011 
(9.01***) 
 
NBS + 0.1031 
(8.52***) 
 
0.1070 
(8.98***) 
 
0.1057 
(9.02***) 
 
NGS + 0.1482 
(13.37***) 
 
0.1396 
(12.79***) 
 
0.1376 
(12.92***) 
 
INVREC + 0.3489 
(11.01***) 
 
0.3794 
(12.14***) 
 
0.3728 
(12.17***) 
 
FOREIGN + 0.2868 
(19.25***) 
 
0.2731 
(18.60***) 
 
0.2634 
(18.45***) 
 
EXORD + 0.1360 
(9.65***) 
 
0.1440 
(10.37***) 
 
0.1482 
(10.95***) 
 
LOSS + 0.1006 
(6.61***) 
 
0.0738 
(4.79***) 
 
0.0770 
(5.15***) 
 
LEV + 0.1543 
(9.70***) 
 
0.1376 
(8.55***) 
 
0.1207 
(7.63***) 
 
ROA - -0.3136 
(-10.43***) 
 
-0.2592 
(-8.73***) 
 
-0.2549 
(-8.72***) 
 
ISSUE + 0.0205 
(1.75*) 
 
0.0163 
(1.41) 
 
0.0112 
(0.99) 
 
BTM - -0.1787 
(-20.85***) 
 
-0.1551 
(-18.03***) 
 
-0.1463 
(-17.42***) 
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      Table 6:   Audit Office Size and Audit Fee (Continued) 
 
|DA 1*| 
 
+ -0.5077 
(-1.72*) 
 
0.5437 
(1.65*) 
 
0.7035 
(2.22**) 
 
Intercept ? 0.0431 
(0.45) 
 
-0.2728 
(-2.62***) 
 
-0.1991 
(-1.98**) 
 
Industry 
dummies 
 Included Included Included 
N  16,559 16,559 16,559 
 
R2  0.7371 
 
0.7461 
 
0.7588 
 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using clustering procedure to correct for serial correlation and White’s (1980) 
method to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
****, ** denote p-value <1% and <5%, respectively with two-tailed tests.  
 
 
 
 
